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Supporters of left-wing parties typically place more emphasis on redistributive
policies than right-wing voters. I investigate whether this difference in tolerating
inequality is amplified by suspicious success — achievements that may arise
from cheating. Using a laboratory experiment, I exogenously vary cheating
opportunities for stakeholders who work on a real effort task and earn money
according to their self-reported performances. An impartial spectator is able to
redistribute the earnings between the stakeholders, although it is not possible to
detect cheating. I find that the opportunity to cheat leads to different views on
whether to accept inequality. Left-wing spectators substantially reduce inequality
when cheating is possible, while the treatment has no significant effect on choices
of right-wing spectators. Since neither differences in beliefs nor differences
in norms about cheating can explain this finding, it seems to be driven by a
difference in preferences. These results suggest that redistributive preferences
will diverge even more once public awareness increases that inequality may be
to a certain extent created by cheating.
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1 Introduction
Whether unequal outcomes are considered to be fair primarily depends on the sources
of inequality. People prefer to eliminate income disparities that have resulted from
factors beyond individual control such as pure luck, physical handicap, gender, or
family background, yet they tend to accept inequalities based on differences in effort,
initiative, or the willingness to take risks (Konow, 2000; Fong, 2001; Cappelen et al.,
2013; Möllerström et al., 2015; Almås et al., 2016). The sources of inequality also lie at
the core of the political debate about redistribution. Whereas right-wingers believe that
one’s fortunes are mainly the consequences of effort and choices, left-wingers place
more emphasis on the notion that uncontrollable luck determines income (Piketty,
1995; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2010; Cappelen et al., 2016).
In this paper, I investigate whether the difference in redistributive preferences
between the two political camps persists with regard to another source of inequality
— cheating. Because everyday life is permeated with cheating opportunities, ranging
from an employee tempted to overstate hours worked to potential submission of false
claims by a physician, people might be suspicious of the wealth of the successful. For
example, the recent leaks of the “Panama Papers” as well as the “Paradise Papers”
have revealed that a large fraction of global financial wealth is held in tax havens.1
Zucman (2014) estimates that annually foregone tax revenues due to offshore tax
evasion amount to $190 billion, which suggests that a significant share of wealth is
created by illegal financial activities.2
A particular feature of inequalities which arise from fraudulent behavior is that
although cheating is within individual control, it is, as opposed to effort, unlikely
to be regarded as fair (e.g., Kirchler et al., 2003). Therefore, it remains an open
1See, e.g., http://www.bbc.com/news/world-41880153, last accessed on March 5, 2018.
2Inequalities based on cheating are not limited to tax evasion, but there are various other forms of
performance cheating that cause someone to be more successful than others. For instance, businessmen
fabricate their curriculum vitae to get better paid jobs, athletes take performance enhancing doping





diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html, last accessed on March 5, 2018).
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question whether left-wingers also demand more redistribution than right-wingers
in the presence of cheating opportunities. However, with regard to the prevalence
of suspicious success, this question needs to be answered in order to understand the
origins of different views on the necessity of redistributive policies.
I address this question by conducting a between-subjects experiment, where
some participants work on a real effort task (henceforth called stakeholders). Two
stakeholders are matched with another and split a fixed amount of money according
to their performances. Stakeholders can overstate their performance in the Cheat
treatment, which does not affect the total income of the two stakeholders but shifts
the distribution of income in favor of the misreporting stakeholder. This captures the
impact of cheating behavior in many situations of economic relevance. For instance,
tax evasion does not alter the amount of money necessary to provide public goods, but
at the same time honest tax payers bear the cost of cheating in the long run. Contrary to
the Cheat treatment, stakeholders’ performances are audited in the Monitor treatment,
which renders misreporting impossible.
Third-party participants (henceforth called spectators) are able to redistribute
the earnings of the two stakeholders (following Cappelen et al., 2013). In both
treatments, they are fully aware of the rules for working on the real effort task and
the (lacking) possibility to misreport own performance. Importantly, in the Cheat
treatment, dishonest stakeholders cannot be identified, and spectators thus never
know whether a stakeholder reported untruthfully. Therefore, if one of the two
stakeholders earns considerably more than the other one, spectators might believe
that high income results from cheating but do not know whether their suspicion is
accurate. This uncertainty leaves room to justify both eliminating inequalities as well
as refraining from doing so.
Using a laboratory experiment allows to provide clean evidence on the effect
of cheating opportunities on inequality acceptance for two main reasons. First, it
allows for exogenous manipulation of the availability to cheat, which is difficult to
achieve in field settings given the nature of naturally occurring cheating opportunities.
Second, eliciting redistributive preferences from impartial spectators makes it possible
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to exclude confounding factors such as selfishness, self-centered inequality aversion
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993).
My results show that the treatment effect depends on political preferences.
Right-wing spectators hesitate to redistribute on the basis of potential cheating as they
implement the same levels of inequality in Monitor and Cheat. In contrast, distributive
choices of left-wing spectators reveal an increase of 74% in inequality reduction due
to cheating opportunities. The analysis of the treatment effect for different levels of
pre-redistribution inequality shows that left-wing spectators react to potential cheating
only for high levels of inequality. This provides evidence that they believe that the
“rich” stakeholder is cheating in these situations.
There are essentially three different explanations for the polarization in
redistributive preferences between the two political camps. (i) Right-wing spectators
might believe to a lesser extent that stakeholders are cheating than left-wingers.
(ii) Right-wing spectators’ norms about cheating differ from those of left-wing
supporters: They find it more acceptable to cheat when possible. (iii) Right-wingers
prefer not to redistribute due to potential cheating if they do not know whether
a stakeholder indeed cheated, although they know that misreporting is prevalent.
In order to distinguish between these three explanations, I examine beliefs and
norms about cheating and find no differences between left-wingers and right-wingers.
Therefore, the political divide in how to deal with unequal outcomes that might
arise from dishonest behavior seems to reflect different preferences. This suggests
that different views on the importance of redistributive policies diverge even more
in the light of scandals about cheating by the “rich and successful” as we know that
redistributive preferences are highly elastic to information (Kuziemko et al., 2015).
My paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it relates to studies
on the determinants of redistributive preferences. Papers that use survey data find
that personal characteristics such as gender, race, and education as well as cultural
background and past experience of personal traumas (e.g., divorce, hospitalization,
or death of a relative) predict redistributive preferences (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005;
Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Moreover, using data from the General Social Survey,
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Fong (2001) shows that people who believe that luck causes poverty and wealth
support redistribution to a much larger extent than people who believe that effort
causes poverty and wealth. In addition, experimental studies indicate that people also
care about whether someone can be held responsible for one’s own luck by choosing
a risky or a safe option (Cappelen et al., 2013; Möllerström et al., 2015). Closely
related to my paper, Bortolotti et al. (2017) experimentally investigate redistributive
preferences when cheating with regard to a risky outcome, a coin flip, is possible.
The authors document a shift in fairness views due to potential cheating in favor of
strict egalitarianism, i.e., implementing an equal distribution of income independent of
subjects’ choices that affected earnings in the first place. Importantly, while Bortolotti
et al. (2017) study redistributive preferences in the light of cheating in the luck domain,
I focus on situations where people can cheat regarding their performance.
Second, my results show that political preferences matter for accepting
inequalities that might arise from cheating behavior. Interestingly, the evidence on
whether political preferences affect choices in allocation decisions is mixed. While a
number of studies report significant differences across political preferences (Van Lange
et al., 2012; Cappelen et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2016; Bortolotti et al., 2017), there
are two studies that find only weakly significant or insignificant effects of political
preferences (Frohlich et al., 1984; Fehr et al., 2006). Therefore, the impact of political
preferences on distributional choices seems to depend on the specific context.
Third, giving participants the opportunity to cheat relates my paper to a
growing experimental literature on dishonesty (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014; Conrads and Lotz,
2015; Houser et al., 2016).3 While this literature is primarily concerned with the extent
and the causes of cheating, my study is one of the few that deal with the consequences
of cheating by showing that dishonesty affects the behavior of third parties (Pigors and
Rockenbach, 2016; Bortolotti et al., 2017; Cappelen et al., 2017).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design in detail. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
3See Abeler et al. (2016) for a meta-study on data from 72 experimental studies on dishonesty.
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2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two main parts. Part 1 concerns the real effort provision
and potential cheating in the matrix task, which was introduced in the literature by
Mazar et al. (2008). Part 2 uses decisions from impartial spectators in order to measure
redistributive preferences, similar to Cappelen et al. (2013). Thereafter, beliefs and
political preferences are elicited.
2.1 Part 1: The Matrix Task
All subjects receive an exercise sheet with 20 matrices, each containing a set of twelve
numbers with two decimal places (see Appendix D.1 for an example). Only two of
these twelve numbers add up to exactly 10. The task is to find these two numbers and
solve as many matrices as possible within 6 minutes.
Two players A (the stakeholders) are randomly matched in order to determine
their preliminary income (i.e., income before redistribution). Proportionally to their
performance in the matrix task, e10 are split up among these two participants. This
distribution of income is rounded to 50 cents.
Treatment variation. After working on the task, the stakeholders are provided
with the correct solutions on their screens and are asked to compare them with their
own solutions (see Figure C.1 in the Appendix for an example of the stakeholders’
decision screen). They then report for each matrix whether they solved it correctly.
Subjects in Monitor are informed that all exercise sheets are collected to verify their
reported performance and that, if necessary, their reports will be changed to their
actual performance.4 In contrast, subjects in Cheat are informed that they will shred
their exercise sheet at the end of the experiment, and it is thus impossible to monitor
their solutions.
The design of Part 1 has at least three desirable features for the purpose of
this study. First, the real effort task mimics a wide range of field settings where
4The fraction of stakeholders for whom performances had to be corrected downwards is 10%
(upwards 5%). In 57% of these cases, the difference between reported and actual performance was
one task.
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people engage in performance cheating in order to serve their self-interests. Consider,
for instance, an employee who misreports his number of hours worked to receive
either a higher wage or more days off. Second, exaggerating own performance
implies a negative externality for the other stakeholder, which reflects the adverse
consequences of cheating in many “real-world” situations. Coming back to the
example of overstating hours worked, honest colleagues might be affected through
a lower likelihood of being promoted due to inferior relative performance. Third,
having a fixed sum of payments for the two stakeholders excludes efficiency concerns
as a motivation for cheating. This is important for redistribution decisions because if
cheating was efficiency enhancing, this might confound the moral assessment of such
behavior and it would be difficult to account for this motive in the experiment.
2.2 Part 2: Redistribution Decisions
Each player B (the spectator) is matched with a pair of stakeholders. The strategy
method is used for the spectators’ decisions. Hence, for each of the eleven possible
distributions of preliminary income (going in steps of 50 cents from maximum
inequality in the case of (10,0) to full equality in the case of (5,5)), they can transfer
money within a pair of stakeholders and consequently determine the two stakeholders’
final income (i.e., income after redistribution).5 Redistribution of the preliminary
income is possible in steps of 10 cents. In order to be able to unambiguously refer
to the stakeholders’ final income, the stakeholder with the higher or equal preliminary
income is called player A1 and the other stakeholder player A2 (see Figure C.2 in the
Appendix for the spectators’ decision screen).
Spectators receive a fixed income of e10 for their redistribution decisions.
Giving spectators at least the sum of earnings of a pair of stakeholders assures that
self-centered inequity aversion based on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) does not affect
spectators’ behavior.6 Moreover, spectators are informed that either their decision or
5Brandts and Charness (2011) provide an analysis of 29 studies in order to compare the strategy
method with the direct respond method. Since they do not find a single case in which there is a treatment
effect using the strategy method that vanishes with the direct respond method, the strategy method is
likely to yield a lower bound for this experiment’s treatment effect.
6For instance, the Fehr-Schmidt model predicts the spectator to choose full equality when receiving
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the decision of another spectator will be randomly implemented, which is designed to
increase the number of decisions taken by spectators.7
2.3 Belief Elicitation
After stakeholders report their performance and spectators make their redistribution
decisions, two beliefs are elicited. First, stakeholders and spectators are asked to
guess the average reported performance of the stakeholders in their own session
(belief-own-treat). Consequently, subjects in Monitor report their belief about how
many tasks were actually solved, while subjects in Cheat guess how many tasks
the stakeholders reported to have solved. Second, I elicit beliefs about how many
correctly solved tasks the stakeholders reported in the respective other treatment
(belief-other-treat). Therefore, subjects are informed that stakeholders worked on exactly
the same task in a previously run experiment but that reported performance was
monitored differently (instructions can be found in Appendix D.4). Subjects learn
about the respective other treatment not before beliefs are elicited.
Beliefs are incentivized with e2 for deviations up to one task and e1 for
deviations up to two tasks, whereas larger deviations are not paid. Only one of
the two beliefs is randomly chosen for payment in order to prevent hedging. Since
belief-other-treat is based on the first session of the respective other treatment, it is not
elicited in the first session of each treatment.
Moreover, I elicit a third belief at the end of each session of the Cheat
treatment. Subjects guess the fraction of stakeholders who did not report truthfully
(belief-frac-cheat). It is impossible to incentivize these beliefs because I refrain from
individual cheating detection.
2.4 Political Preferences
At the end of the experiment, I ask participants about their political preferences (i.e.,
which party they would vote for if there were federal elections next Sunday). In
a fixed income of e5, independent of the distribution of preliminary income.
7As a consequence, the number of spectators (n = 182) equals the number of stakeholders (n = 182).
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my analysis, being left-wing is defined as indicating to vote for the Social Democrats
(SPD), the Green Party (Die Grünen), the socialist party (Die Linke), or the Pirate Party
Germany (Die Piraten).8 Subjects belonging to the remaining categories are treated
as being right-wing. Following this definition, 37.36% of the spectators are classified
as left-wing and 62.64% as right-wing. The distribution of spectators’ votes closely
resembles the results of the 2017 German national election. Thus, in terms of political
preferences, the sample of the experiment is similar to the German population. In
order to validate my classification of political parties, subjects are asked to indicate
where they rate their general political attitudes on a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being left
and 10 being right. Although this question may be susceptible to the central tendency
bias (64% of subjects indicate a score of 4, 5, or 6), left-wing spectators rate themselves
lower on this scale than right-wing spectators (mean left-wing = 3.94, mean right-wing
= 5.37). The difference in ratings across political preferences is significant (p < 0.0001,
Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Table A.1 in the Appendix shows which parties
spectators would vote for, the 2017 German federal election results as well as the
average scores of spectators’ general political attitudes.
2.5 Procedural Details
The experiment was conducted with 364 participants at the Munich Experimental
Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences (MELESSA) at the University of Munich
in May 2016 and May 2017. In total, 184 subjects were assigned to eight sessions
of the Monitor treatment and 180 subjects to eight sessions of the Cheat treatment.9
Subjects were students from various fields of study and recruited using the online
system “ORSEE” (Greiner, 2015). Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the
two treatments and participated in one session only. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher, 2007).
8A coalition of the three established parties SPD, Die Grünen, and Die Linke is also called
“left-wing coalition”, see, e.g., http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/
10318949/Germanys-coalitions-What-happens-next.html (last accessed on March 5, 2018). The
Pirate Party Germany, which was found in 2006, is typically classified as being left-wing.
9For each of the two treatments, half of the sessions were conducted in 2016 and the other half in
2017. The time of conducting the experiment does not affect the results (see Section 3.2).
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Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects found a printed version of the instructions
of Part 1 at their seats, which was read aloud by the experimenter (myself) to ensure
common knowledge about the rules of the real effort task (see Appendix D.1). In
addition, these instructions informed participants that only later on they will be
assigned to one of the two roles. Hence, stakeholders as well as spectators worked
on the matrix task. In this way, spectators were familiar with the difficulty of the
matrix task, which was important for eliciting their beliefs about the stakeholders’
performances. Furthermore, subjects were told that the spectator can distribute
earnings of Part 1 and that the spectator will receive more detailed information on
this at a later point in time.10 Thereafter, subjects received the exercise sheet and
were provided with pens for marking their solutions. After timeout, a second set
of instructions about how to compare own with correct solutions appeared on the
subjects’ screens and were read aloud (see Appendix D.2). Subsequently, subjects
were displayed their role, and stakeholders self-reported their performance while
spectators received detailed instructions about Part 2 (see Appendix D.3) and made
their redistribution decisions. Thus, only stakeholders compared their own solutions
with the correct ones. After that, the exercise sheets were collected and verified in
Monitor, and subjects in both treatments indicated on a 4 point Likert scale whether
they considered it to be fair that preliminary income was proportional to self-reported
performance. Next, belief-own-treat and belief-other-treat were elicited.
Finally, the participants answered a questionnaire about their political
preferences, opinion on income inequality in Germany on a scale from 1 (inequality
should be reduced) to 10 (inequality should be enlarged in order to provide incentives),
socio-demographic characteristics, and their belief about the fraction of stakeholders
who did not report truthfully (belief-frac-cheat, only in the Cheat treatment). Subjects
received their payments privately after the experiment and earned e12.22 on average,
including an average show-up fee of e4.5.11 Sessions lasted on average 50 minutes.
10Little information about Part 2 cannot exclude the possibility of strategic effort provision. However,
this would not affect spectators redistributive choices because they were elicited with the strategy
method and are thus independent of actual performances.
11The show-up fee was e4 in 2016 and e5 in 2017 due to changes of the rules of MELESSA.
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3 Results
3.1 Matrix Task Performance
Figure 1 shows that reported performances are significantly higher in Cheat than in
Monitor and indicates that manipulation by giving stakeholders the opportunity to
cheat was successful (p < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Average reported
performance is higher in Cheat (13.8) than in Monitor (11.5). Moreover, while only 5.4%
of the stakeholders in Monitor indicate to have solved all matrices, this is the case for
16.7% of the stakeholders in Cheat. This is line with the finding of previous studies on
dishonesty that although some people are cheating, the assumption of people always
submitting payoff-maximizing reports is empirically not valid (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008;
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Figure 1: Distribution of reported performances
In addition, subjects’ beliefs about average reported performance in their own
session is significantly different across treatments (p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney U-test,
two-sided). On average, belief-own-treat is 1.9 tasks higher in Cheat than in Monitor,
which is close to the actual difference of 2.3 tasks. Furthermore, subjects in Monitor
find the income generating process of preliminary income significantly more fair than
subjects in Cheat (p = 0.037, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Both of these results
are further indications of successful treatment manipulation.
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3.2 Inequality Acceptance and Political Preferences
The redistribution decisions of the spectators determine the final income distribution
between two stakeholders. In order to quantify the extend to which spectators are
willing to accept inequalities, I use the Gini coefficient as inequality measure:
Inequality =
|Income Player A1 − Income Player A2|
Income Player A1 + Income Player A2
This measure of inequality relates the absolute difference in income to the total
income and is zero in cases of full equality and one if one of the two stakeholders
receives the entire total income. I define aggregate inequality as the average over
the Gini coefficients of the eleven possible distributions of preliminary income.
Thus, aggregate inequality contains the spectator’s decisions for perfectly unequal
preliminary incomes of (10,0), full equality in the case of (5,5) as well as all cases in
between. Using this measure yields a lower bound for the treatment effect because
one can expect hardly any redistribution in cases of low inequality (e.g., (5,5)) in both
treatments.
Figure 2 shows the mean aggregate inequality across the two treatments and
political preferences. If a spectator never redistributes income, aggregate inequality is
0.5, which is indicated by the horizontal dashed line. Left-wing spectators implement
significantly lower inequality in Cheat than in Monitor (p = 0.027, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). While they eliminate 26.2% of initial inequality in Monitor, they
reduce inequality by 45.6% in Cheat, implying an increase of 74% in inequality
reduction. In contrast, the treatment has no significant effect for right-wing spectators
(p = 0.641, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). They reduce inequality by 27.8% in
Monitor and 25.8% in Cheat.
Table 1 contains a series of Tobit regressions to account for using the censored
dependent variable aggregate inequality. Column (1) suggests that aggregate
inequality is not affected by the treatment for the pooled sample, which is due to
the fact that the majority of spectators are right-wing. Column (2) confirms the
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Notes: The figure shows aggregate inequality defined as the average Gini coefficient of all
eleven redistribution decisions. The dashed line indicates aggregate inequality in case of no
redistribution. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure 2: Aggregate inequality
opportunities when being left-wing (p = 0.004). However, the treatment does not
affect implemented inequality of right-wing spectators. The sum of the treatment
dummy and the interaction term “Cheat × Right-wing” in column (2) indicates that
the treatment effect for right-wing spectators is insignificant (p = 0.791, F-Test).12
Furthermore, being right-wing has no impact on aggregate inequality in the Monitor
treatment (p = 0.805). In column (3), I add as regressor the answer to whether
the spectators are of the opinion that income inequality should be reduced, or
enlarged in order to provide incentives for individual performance. Believing that
“we need inequality” increases implemented income inequality, while the treatment
effect remains significant for left-wing spectators (p = 0.003). Hence, differences in
the opinion on inequality13 cannot explain that the effect of cheating opportunities
depends on political preferences. The results are robust to adding a time dummy
12Interpreting the coefficient of an interaction term can be misleading in Tobit models (Ai and
Norton, 2003). To examine this problem, I perform an alternative calculation of the interaction effect
by computing the predicted values of aggregate inequality separately for left-wing and right-wing
spectators in Monitor and Cheat. The respective difference in differences of these four groups’ predicted
values are of the same size as the marginal effect of the interaction terms in the models of column (2) to
(6) in Table 1. Thus, the bias induced by using interaction terms in a nonlinear model is negligible in my
estimations.
13Right-wing spectators (mean = 4.95) favor inequality significantly more than left-wing spectators
(mean = 3.49, p < 0.0001, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).
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Table 1: Aggregate inequality
Dependent variable Aggregate inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cheat −0.036 −0.112*** −0.110*** −0.110*** −0.089** −0.118***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039)
Right-wing −0.010 −0.028 −0.032 −0.006 −0.021
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.048)
Cheat × Right-wing 0.120** 0.116** 0.115** 0.128** 0.164***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.062) (0.058)
We need inequality 0.014* 0.013* 0.010 0.012
(1 = no, 10 = yes) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Constant 0.358*** 0.364*** 0.316*** 0.334*** 0.306*** 0.215**
(0.010) (0.030) (0.040) (0.077) (0.075) (0.101)
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 144
Log likelihood 1.433 4.589 6.502 7.931 9.596 21.228
Notes: Two-limit Tobit regressions regressions on aggregate inequality. Columns (4) to (6) include a binary variable for whether
the experiment was conducted in 2016 or 2017 (insignificant in all specifications) and additional covariates from the questionnaire:
age, gender, semester, and number of experiments so far (all insignificant in all specifications). Column (5) includes the categories
“other party” and nonvoters in the definition of being left-wing. Column (6) excludes spectators who would vote for “other party”
as well as nonvoters. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance on the
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(whether the experiment was conducted in 2016 or 2017) as well as personal
background characteristics in column (4). In column (5), I include nonvoters and
spectators who indicate to vote for “other party” in the definition of left-wing instead
of right-wing. The results are robust to this specification (with the exception that the
significance of the treatment dummy decreases to p = 0.031). Furthermore, the results
are also robust to excluding nonvoters and spectators who would vote for “other
party” in column (6).14
In order to provide further evidence that left-wing spectators’ decisions are
affected by the treatment because they suspect player A1 to be cheating, I analyze
each redistribution decision separately. A spectator should doubt the performance
14In addition to investigating the Gini coefficient, I use the amount of money redistributed by
spectators to study treatment differences. This is important because spectators might redistribute
away from player A1 — who receives the higher preliminary income of the two stakeholders except
for the case of full equality — in such a way that after redistribution player A2 has more income
than player A1. For instance, a spectator in Cheat might determine the final income distribution to
be (2,8) when preliminary incomes were (8,2), which results in the same inequality before and after
redistribution. However, it is important to capture this incidence of redistribution as it might reflect
punishing player A1 for potential cheating. Results on redistribution are reported in Appendix A and
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Treatment Effect on Inequality for Right-Wing
Notes: The figure shows the treatment effect on implemented inequality by subtracting
inequality in the Monitor treatment from inequality in the Cheat treatment. The effect is shown
separately for each preliminary level of income of player A1. The left panel displays the effect
for left-wing spectators and the right panel for right-wing spectators. Error bars indicate
standard errors of the mean.
Figure 3: Treatment effect on inequality
of a stakeholder if it is far above the other stakeholder’s performance, which results
in high income inequality.15 In contrast, there is little reason to attribute cheating to
a stakeholder when income is evenly distributed and thus reported performances of
both stakeholders are similar.16
Figure 3 shows the treatment effect depending on preliminary income
distribution for left-wing (left panel) and right-wing spectators (right panel). The
very left and the very right bar represent the treatment effect when the income
distribution before redistribution is (10,0) and (5,5) respectively.17 The treatment has
a significantly negative effect on the implemented inequality of left-wing spectators
for high pre-redistribution inequality. Two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests indicate a
reduction in inequality if player A1 has a preliminary income of at least 7.5 (p-values
do not exceed 0.0334), while there is no significant treatment effect otherwise (with the
exception of player A1 having e6.5 before redistribution, p = 0.072). These results
suggest that left-wing spectators suspect player A1 to cheat when initial inequality
is high and therefore reduce inequality in these cases. There is no significant effect
15This holds true even more when only one of the two stakeholders can cheat. To analyze the impact
of asymmetric cheating opportunities within a pair of stakeholders, I ran an additional treatment where
only one of the two stakeholders could misreport the own performance. The results of this treatment
are reported in Appendix B.
16In this case, both stakeholders could be cheating. However, there is no possibility to redistribute
away from a suspicious potential cheater to another presumably more honest stakeholder because it is
not possible to detect cheating.
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627 observations, 57 subjects
Cheat, Right-Wing
Notes: The figure shows the spectators’ redistribution decisions depending on treatment
(upper panels show Monitor and lower panels Cheat) and political preferences (left panels
show left-wing and right panels right-wing spectators). Numbers in circles in case of no
redistribution when the preliminary income of player A1 is e5 indicate the number of
observations and serve as a benchmark for the remaining circles.
Figure 4: Overview redistribution decisions
of cheating opportunities for any of the preliminary income distributions when being
right-wing.
Despite analyzing implemented inequality, the question remains which kind of
redistribution decisions drive the treatment effect for left-wing spectators. Therefore,
Figure 4 depicts player A1’s income after redistribution contingent on his income
before redistribution. Circles on the downward-sloping line indicate cases of no
redistribution, circles on the horizontal line cases of redistribution resulting in full
equality, and circles between the two lines are associated with redistribution away
from player A1 such that the ranking of incomes is maintained. The few circles
above the downward-sloping line represent “negative redistribution”, which leaves
the pair of stakeholders with higher inequality after redistribution at the expense
of player A2. Circles below the horizontal line indicate “overredistribution”, where
player A1 receives a lower income than player A2.
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Supporting the previous findings, systematic treatment differences can be
inferred from Figure 4 only for left-wing spectators. Two-sided Fisher’s exact tests
reveal that the fraction of full equality is significantly higher in Cheat (lower left panel)
than in Monitor (upper left panel) if player A1 has a preliminary income between 10
and 7.5, or 6.5 (five comparisons are significant at the 5% and two at the 10% level).
This is in line with the result depicted in Figure 3 that left-wing spectators only react
to cheating opportunities by implementing a lower inequality when the preliminary
income distribution is unequal. In addition, there is a higher fraction of left-wing
spectators in Cheat than in Monitor that always implement full equality independent of
preliminary incomes (21.2% vs. 5.7%; p = 0.079, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided). These
two results suggest that the treatment difference for left-wing spectators is driven
by an increase in redistribution decisions that result in full equality when cheating
opportunities are present.
The analysis of this section shows that left-wing spectators are less willing to
accept inequalities when cheating is possible. Looking at their decisions contingent
on the income distribution before spectators can redistribute suggests that this is the
case because they suspect the stakeholder with higher initial income of cheating.
As a consequence, left-wing spectators implement more often a perfectly equal
income distribution between the two stakeholders. The interaction between cheating
opportunities and being left-wing cannot be explained by differences in their opinion
on income inequality. In the next section, I therefore investigate whether different
beliefs or norms about cheating across left-wing and right-wing spectators can account
for this finding.
3.3 Beliefs and Norms about Cheating
Apart from preferences, there are two alternative explanations for why treatment
differences depend on political color. (i) Beliefs about cheating might interact with
being left-wing. If in the Cheat treatment left-wing spectators believe to a larger
extent that stakeholders are cheating than right-wing spectators, this might account
for the treatment effect. (ii) Norms about cheating might differ between left-wing and
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right-wing spectators. If right-wing spectators find it more acceptable to cheat when
there is an opportunity to do so than left-wing spectators, this could also explain the
results.
Beliefs about cheating can be inferred from the three different measures of
beliefs in the Cheat treatment. First, subjects were asked to guess the average
reported performance in their own session (belief-own-treat) and the average reported
performance in the Monitor treatment (belief-other-treat). Subtracting the latter from
the former one indicates the spectator’s belief to which extent stakeholders cheated
on average. This difference is not significantly different between left-wing (mean
= 2.65) and right-wing (mean = 2.02) spectators (p = 0.389, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). Second, I also compare belief-own-treat between the two groups
because spectators’ answers to the belief about the Monitor treatment (belief-other-treat)
could suffer from self-serving ex-post rationalization of their redistribution decisions.
Belief-own-treat is not significantly different between left-wing (mean = 10.88)
and right-wing spectators (mean = 11.21; p = 0.666, Mann-Whitney U-test,
two-sided). Third, subjects in Cheat were asked to guess the fraction of dishonest
stakeholders (belief-frac-cheat). Again, beliefs do not differ between left-wing (58%)
and right-wing spectators (57%; p = 0.807, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Thus,
although right-wing spectators believe to the same extent as left-wing spectators that
stakeholders are cheating, they are not willing to redistribute more in Cheat than in
Monitor.
It has been shown that norms (behavior that people perceive as appropriate)
have predictive power for subjects’ actual behavior (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013).
In addition, several studies in the economics literature use actual behavior to identify
norms (e.g., Camerer and Fehr, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). Therefore, I use
actual cheating behavior of the stakeholders as a proxy for the spectators’ norms about
cheating. Performances in the Monitor treatment show that left-wing and right-wing
stakeholders are equally able to work on the matrix task (p = 0.977, Mann-Whitney
U-test, two-sided). While their average performance in Monitor is 11.53 and 11.5
tasks respectively, in Cheat, left-wing stakeholders report to have solved 14.35 tasks
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and right-wing stakeholders 13.08 tasks. This difference between the two groups is
not significant (p = 0.283, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). If anything, left-wing
stakeholders tend to cheat more than right-wing stakeholders. However, there is no
significant evidence that the norm about cheating depends on political preferences.
In particular, looking at actual behavior suggests that right-wing stakeholders do not
find it more acceptable to cheat than left-wing stakeholders and I assume that the same
holds true for right-wing and left-wing spectators.18
Finding no differences in beliefs and norms about cheating between left-wing and
right-wing spectators suggests that the difference in their choices reflects a difference
in preferences. Right-wing spectators are reluctant to take away money from a
stakeholder due to potential cheating if they do not know whether this stakeholder
actually cheated. In contrast, left-wing spectators are willing to redistribute more if
they believe that someone has cheated — even without being able to detect cheating.
4 Concluding Remarks
The sources of inequality largely influence what people consider to be a fair
distribution of income and wealth within a society. Assuming that fiscal imbalances
will rise in most western countries due to demographic trends, these redistributive
preferences will be particularly relevant for designing welfare policies in the future
and thus constitute an important issue in public economics (Kuziemko et al., 2015).
In this paper, I focus on cheating as a potential source of unequal outcomes. I
find large differences in how to deal with these inequalities depending on political
preferences. Supporters of left-wing parties substantially redistribute incomes when
cheating is possible, while supporters of right-wing parties refrain from redistribution.
As a consequence, cheating opportunities — which receive increasing public attention
through recent revelations about fraudulent behavior — amplify the disagreement
over redistributive policies between the political left and right.
A deeper look into my data reveals that left-wing spectators’ redistribution
18Since roles were randomly assigned in the experiment, norms of stakeholders and spectators should
not systematically differ from each other.
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decisions are only affected by potential misreporting in cases of large income
differences. This provides strong evidence that left-wing spectators suspect a “rich”
stakeholder to be cheating. Furthermore, my results suggest that both beliefs and
norms about cheating do not depend on political color. Hence, right-wingers refrain
from redistribution although they believe that stakeholders are cheating and although
they are themselves reluctant to cheat to the full extent. This shows that right-wing
spectators hesitate to redistribute if they do not know for sure that high relative income
was acquired by dishonest means, while left-wingers are less concerned about this.
These findings might help to understand the political debate about how to
tackle tax evasion and can inform politicians about the consequences of preventing
fraudulent behavior. An example for fighting tax evasion are a couple of German
federal states which bought tax CDs that contain information about German tax
dodgers’ Swiss bank accounts. While the Social Democrats advocate the potentially
illegal purchases from whistleblowers, the Conservatives object such measures.19 One
reason for these different strategies might be that tax CDs purchases raises attention to
potential cheating, which is, according to my findings, beneficial for left-wing parties
with regard to justifying redistributive policies.
Further implications might be drawn concerning the different extent of
redistributive policies between Europe and the United States. Europeans prefer
substantially more redistribution than U.S. Americans (Almås et al., 2016), which can
be partly explained by differences in beliefs about whether luck or effort determine
inequalities (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). As U.S. Americans seem to be far less
skeptical towards the very rich, perceived cheating opportunities might also contribute
to explain cross-country evidence on redistributive policies. Therefore, exploring how
redistributive preferences are affected by potential cheating in the United States as
opposed to Europe is a fruitful avenue for further research.
19See, e.g., http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-authorities-
investigate-ubs-in-relation-to-tax-evasion-a-849366.html, last accessed on March 5, 2018.
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Table A.1: Voting behavior and political left-right score of spectators &
2017 German federal election results
Political Party Experiment (in %) 2017 federal election (in %) left-right scale
CDU/CSU 28.57 25.02 5.73
SPD 14.84 15.58 4.04
Die Grünen 14.29 7.02 4.08
Die Linke 6.04 6.79 3.45
AFD 3.30 8.17 7.67
FDP 9.89 9.60 5.56
Die Piraten 2.20 0.28 3.75
Other party 6.04 3.51 4.73
Would not go to the election 14.84 24.03 4.30
Notes: The parties are the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green Party (Die Grünen), the
socialist party (Die Linke), the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AFD), the libertarian party (FDP), and the Pirate
Party Germany (Die Piraten). Results of the 2017 German federal election are based on the “second vote” and calculated
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Notes: The figure shows aggregate redistribution in e defined as the average redistribution of
all eleven redistribution decisions. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure A.1: Aggregate redistribution
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Figure A.1 is equivalent to Figure 2 for redistribution instead of inequality. As for
inequality, aggregate redistribution is defined as the average over all eleven decisions
of the spectator.20 Left-wing spectators react to the treatment even stronger when
looking at redistribution instead of inequality. They redistribute twice as much in
the Cheat treatment than in the Monitor treatment, which is highly significant (p <
0.01, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). There is no significant effect of cheating
opportunities for right-wing spectators (p = 0.433, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).
Regression results for aggregate redistribution can be found in Table A.2 and are in line
with the findings on inequality in Table 1.
Table A.2: Aggregate redistribution
Dependent variable Aggregate redistribution in e
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cheat 0.215 0.745*** 0.737*** 0.758*** 0.478* 0.795***
(0.142) (0.246) (0.240) (0.252) (0.265) (0.260)
Right-wing 0.148 0.233 0.247 0.010 0.210
(0.236) (0.237) (0.231) (0.320) (0.300)
Cheat × Right-wing −0.840*** −0.818*** −0.820*** −0.593 −0.930***
(0.307) (0.284) (0.280) (0.374) (0.341)
We need inequality −0.065** −0.064** −0.052 −0.077*
(1 = no, 10 = yes) (0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.045)
Constant 0.844*** 0.752*** 0.983*** 0.800* 0.959** 1.268**
(0.078) (0.165) (0.176) (0.478) (0.457) (0.520)
Additional controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 144
Log likelihood -274.643 -270.166 -268.661 -264.546 -265.249 -202.152
Notes: Two-limit Tobit regressions regressions on aggregate redistribution (lower limit: –82.5, upper limit: 82.5). Columns (4) to
(6) include a binary variable for whether the experiment was conducted in 2016 or 2017 (insignificant in all specifications) and
additional covariates from the questionnaire: age, gender, semester, and number of experiments so far. Column (5) includes the
categories “other party” and nonvoters in the definition of being left-wing. Column (6) excludes spectators who would vote
for “other party” as well as nonvoters. Robust and clustered (on session level) standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate
significance on the levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
20Decisions in which the spectator redistributes away from player A2 are also taken into account.
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Notes: The figure shows inequality separately for each level of preliminary income of
player A1. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
Figure A.2: Inequality by preliminary income
Figure A.2 shows inequality depending on preliminary income distribution and
treatment for left-wing (left panel) and right-wing spectators (right panel). The two
very left and very right bars represent inequality when the income distribution before
redistribution is (10,0) and (5,5) respectively. Inequality is not significantly different
between left-wing and right-wing spectators in any of the redistribution decisions in
the Monitor treatment (Mann-Whitney U-tests, two-sided).
B The Mixed Treatment
I conducted an additional treatment to find out how unequal cheating opportunities
affect inequality acceptance. This is motivated by “real-world” examples where only
some people are able to cheat, while it is much harder or even impossible for others to
report untruthfully. Consider, for instance, the cases of tax evasion, doping in sports,
and faking educational achievements. Only individuals who are subject to tax can
evade taxes, and only the “rich” might have the means to do this large-scale. Only
professional athletes have access to well known doping doctors. And only people
belonging to the higher education system have the opportunity to plagiarize a PhD
thesis. Therefore, I implement a treatment called Mixed, where only one of the two
stakeholders is able to cheat. While in the Cheat treatment it was unclear whether
both or only one of the two stakeholders cheated, even in cases with high preliminary
inequality, it is clearer that the stakeholder with a much higher income is presumably
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cheating in the Mixed treatment. Furthermore, spectators might perceive it as unfair
that only one of the two stakeholders has the opportunity to cheat. For these reasons,
inequality should be even more reduced in Mixed than in Cheat.
Procedural Details. Eight sessions of the Mixed treatment were conducted in
May and June 2017 with a total of 172 subjects. Subjects earned e12.94 on average,
including a e5 show-up fee. The exercise sheet was collected only from one of the
two stakeholders. After working on the matrix task, it was publicly announced that
subjects will next be informed about their role and whether their exercise sheet will be
collected (see Appendix D.2). Hence, all participants, including the spectators, knew
that the stakeholders were aware of their cheating opportunities before stating their
performance and that only one of the two stakeholders could cheat.
Results. In the Mixed treatment, reported performance of subjects that were
monitored (mean of 11 tasks) do not significantly differ from those that were able to
cheat (12.63; p = 0.158, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). Since reported performance
of the monitored stakeholders in Mixed is generated under the exactly same conditions
as of stakeholders in Monitor, these observations can be pooled and compared with
potential cheaters in Mixed. Again, performances do not significantly differ (p = 0.176,
Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).21 In line with stakeholders’ actual performances,
beliefs of spectators about reported performance in their own session (belief-own-treat)
do not significantly differ between Monitor (9.35 on average) and Mixed (9.31; p =
0.832, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided). In addition, asking spectators in Mixed about
the average performance of stakeholders in the Cheat treatment (belief-other-treat in
the Mixed treatment) reveals that spectators in Mixed believe reported performance
to be higher in Cheat (12.87) than in Mixed (p < 0.0001, Wilcoxon signed rank
test, two-sided). Moreover, spectators’ beliefs about the ratio of cheaters to those
stakeholders who are able to cheat (belief-frac-cheat) are higher in Cheat (57%) than in
Mixed (50%; p = 0.036, Mann-Whitney U-test, two-sided).22 Hence, spectators seem to
21Based on these observations (135 subjects that cannot cheat with a mean of 11.35 tasks solved
as baseline and 43 potential cheaters), I calculate the minimal detectable difference of a two-sided
Mann-Whitney U-test for the 5% significance level. A treatment difference of at least 2.25 tasks is
detected with a statistical power of 80%. Thus, the sample is large enough to detect treatment differences
in performance of a similar size as implied by the difference between Monitor and Cheat (2.29 tasks).
22Belief-frac-cheat is not incentivized and likely to be overstated due to demand effects by explicitly
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anticipate stakeholders (missing) dishonest behavior as there is no clear evidence that
spectators in Mixed believe stakeholders to be cheating.
As a consequence of failed treatment manipulation in the Mixed treatment,
implemented aggregate inequality does neither differ for right-wing (p = 0.467)
nor left-wing spectators (p = 0.670) between Monitor and Mixed (Mann-Whitney
U-tests, two-sided). In summary, the null hypothesis of equal performance between
stakeholders that are monitored and those who are not cannot be rejected. The low or
nonexistent occurrence of cheating might be a result of stakeholders finding it unfair
that only one of them can cheat. When designing this treatment, it was difficult to
predict this finding since this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first treatment where
only one of two subjects who are otherwise in exactly the same position can cheat.23 In
line with this, spectators in Mixed seem to anticipate stakeholders’ behavior as I find no
evidence that they believe stakeholders to be cheating. Given this, it is not surprising
that I do not find a treatment effect in Mixed.
asking for the fraction of cheaters. Therefore, I refrain from interpreting the size of this belief but only
compare the difference across treatments.
23This conclusion is drawn from comparing the Mixed treatment to treatments of 72 papers analyzed
in a meta-study by Abeler et al. (2016).
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C Screenshots of Decision Screens
Figure C.1: Screenshot of one of the stakeholder’s decision screens
Figure C.2: Screenshot of the spectator’s decision screen
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D Instructions
D.1 General Instructions at the Beginning of the Experiment
[In paper form]24
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please do not talk to other participants of the experiment from now on.
General information on the procedure
This experiment serves to investigate economic decision making behavior. You can
earn money, which will be paid to you individually and in cash after the experiment
has ended.
If you have any questions after reading these instructions or during the experiment,
please raise your hand or press the red button on your keyboard. We will then come
to you and answer your question in private.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will make decisions. Your
own decisions as well as the decisions of other participants can determine your
payoffs. These payoffs are determined according to the rules which are explained in
the following.
Payment
At the end of the experiment, you will receive in cash the money that you have earned
during the experiment and additional 5 euro for showing up in time. Therefore, we
will call every participant based on his seat number, i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know your payment, and also you will not get to know the payments of other
participants.
Anonymity
Data from this experiment will be analyzed anonymously, i.e., we will never link your
24The instructions were translated from German. The original version is available upon request.
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name to the data of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign
a receipt confirming that you received your payment. This receipt serves accounting
purposes only.
Assignment of Roles
There are two different roles in this experiment: A and B. The role of each participant
is determined randomly. Whether you are participant A or B will be communicated to
you at a later point in time on your screen.
Your Task
At the beginning of the experiment, we will hand out an exercise sheet, which we will
place upside down on your desk. Please turn the sheet over only when you are asked
to do so. There are 20 tasks on the exercise, which are numbered top down. It does not
matter on which task you work first.
Each task consists of a box containing 12 numbers. Here is an example:
1,69 1,82 2,91 
4,67 3,81 3,05 
5,82 5,06 4,28 
6,36 6,19 4,57 
Example
Only two numbers in the box add up to 10.00. It is your task to find these two numbers
and to circle them. In the following, you see the correct solution for the example.
1,69 1,82 2,91 
4,67 3,81 3,05 
5,82 5,06 4,28 
6,36 6,19 4,57 
Correct solution of the example
You have 6 minutes to work on the tasks. For your guidance, a clock will display the
remaining time on your screen. After the 6 minutes expired, please put down your
pen. Subsequently, we will collect your pens.
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Income of Participant A
After timeout, participant A compares the numbers which he marked to the solution.
You will receive more information on this after working on the task. Participant A
receives 1 point for every correct solution.
Two participants A are randomly assigned to each other in order to determine their
incomes. 10 euro will be split up among these two participants. Income is proportional
to the number of points achieved in the preceding task and rounded to 50 cents.
Example 1: One participant A achieved 6 points and the other participant A 4 points.
Thus, both participants A have achieved 10 points in total. The participant A with 6
points therefore receives an income of 6.00 euro ((6 points / 10 points) x 10 euro = 6
euro). The participant A with 4 points receives an income of 4 Euro ((4 points / 10
points) x 10 euro = 4.00 euro).
Example 2: One participant A achieved 12 points and the other participant A 7 points.
Thus, both participants A have achieved 19 points in total. The participant A with 12
points therefore receives an income of 6.50 euro ((12 points / 19 points) x 10 euro =
6.32, rounded to 50 cents). The participant A with 7 points receives an income of 3.50
euro ((7 points / 19 points) x 10 euro = 3.68 euro, rounded to 50 cents).
Income of Participant B
Participant B can distribute the incomes which participants A earned. Participants B
will receive detailed information about this on their screen later on.
Further Procedures
We will soon hand out an exercise sheet to each of you. Please leave this sheet upside
down until we announce the beginning of the task. After you have finished the task,
the computer determines whether you are participant A or B. You will be informed
about this on your screen. The assignment of roles is random. During the experiment,
you will receive further information on your screen.
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D.2 Treatment Variation after the Matrix Task
[On the screens of the participants]
Entering of Solutions
All participants have now worked on the task.
Participants A will soon have 3 minutes to compare the numbers which he marked to
the solution as follows:
On the left hand side of the screen, participant A sees the correct solution of the tasks.
On the right hand side of the screen, participant A should indicate whether the correct
solution corresponds to the numbers that he marked on his exercise sheet. After
timeout, participants A automatically proceed to the next screen and can no longer
compare solutions.
On the next screen, you will see an example of the screen on which participant A
compares his solutions with the correct solutions. This screen will be displayed to
you for 15 seconds. You do neither have to indicate something nor click on OK. The
tasks on the following screen are examples. Please click now on OK.
[new screen]
[Monitor treatment only]
Important: After all participants A have compared their solutions to the correct
solutions, we collect the exercise sheets of all participants. We then verify that
participant A did not make any mistake when comparing his solutions to the correct
ones. If participant A made a mistake, we will correct the number of points of
participant A. You will soon be informed whether you are participant A or B. Please
click now on OK.
[Cheat treatment only]
Important: You will receive your payment in the room next door. There is also a
shredder in this room. At the end of the experiment, you will shred your exercise
sheet and afterwards receive your payment. This ensures that we cannot trace back
x
your solutions. You will soon be informed whether you are participant A or B. Please
click now on OK.
[Mixed treatment only, see Appendix B]
Important: After all participants A have compared their solutions to the correct
solutions, we collect the exercise sheets of one of the two matched participants A.
We then verify that this participant A did not make any mistake when comparing his
solutions to the correct ones. If this participant A made a mistake, we will correct the
number of points of this participant A. We do not collect the exercise sheet of the other
participant A. You will receive your payment in the room next door. There is also a
shredder in this room. If we do not collect your exercise sheet, please put it in the
envelope which you find on your desk. All participants have to seal their envelopes
and shred it before receiving their payoff. This ensures that we cannot trace back the
solutions of the participants whose exercise sheets we do not collect. You will soon be
informed whether you are participant A or B, and whether we will collect your exercise
sheet. Please click now on OK.
D.3 Instructions for Participant B
[On screens of participants B while participants A compare their solutions to correct
solutions; not read aloud by experimenter]
Your Decisions
As participant B you will be randomly assigned to 2 participants A among whom
10 euro will be split up as described in the instructions. We call this income, which
they receive for working on the task, preliminary income of participants A. You will
now determine the final income of participants A for every possible distribution of the
preliminary incomes.
You see the table where you will enter the final incomes further below. [table without
possibility to enter something is shown at the bottom of the screen] Final incomes of
participants A, which you determine, must add up to 10 euro. You may enter final
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incomes in 10 cents steps. In order to assign final incomes unambiguously, we call the
two participants A “participant A1” and “participant A2”.
After the two participants A compared their solutions to the correct solutions,
preliminary incomes will be determined. This income then corresponds to one row in
the table: e.g., 7 euro for participant A1 and 3 euro for participant A2. Participants A
will receive the final incomes that you enter in the same row on the right side of the
table (e.g., next to 7 euro for participant A1 and 3 euro for participant A2). Hence, each
of your decisions can be decisive for the payoffs of the participants A!
[new screen]
Implementation of Your Decision
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly determine whether your
decision or the decision of another participant B will be implemented. The probability
for your decision to be implemented is 50%.
Your Income
As participant B you receive a fixed income of 10 euro independent of your decision.
You will make your decisions on the next screen.
D.4 Incentivized Belief Elicitation
[On screens of participants; not read aloud by experimenter; text in Monitor]
Assessment
You will provide two assessments in the following. You will receive details hereto on
the next two screens. You are paid for the accuracy of your assessments.
However, only one of the two assessments is paid. At the end of the experiment,
the computer will randomly determine which of the two assessments is paid. The




All participants A now have compared their solutions to the correct ones. Please assess
how many points participants A achieved on average in the task at the beginning of
the experiment.
You are paid for the accuracy of your assessment. If your assessment deviates less than
1 point from the actual average, you will receive 2 euro additional to your remaining
income from the experiment. If your assessment deviates at least 1 point but less than
2 points from the actual average, you will receive 1 euro. Larger deviations are not
paid.
How many points did the participants A achieve on average? (integers only)
[new screen]
Assessment 2
We now ask you to provide an assessment for a similar experiment. In the other
experiment, participants worked on exactly the same task on which you have worked
in the current experiment.
Important
In contrast to the current experiment, exercise sheets were not collected and it was not
verified that the solutions had been compared without making a mistake. Participants
were aware of this before comparing the solutions.
Please assess how many points participants A achieved on average in the other
experiment.
As before, you are paid for the accuracy of your assessment. If your assessment
deviates less than 1 point from the actual average, you will receive 2 euro additional
to your remaining income from the experiment. If your assessment deviates at least 1
point but less than 2 points from the actual average, you will receive 1 euro. Larger
deviations are not paid.
How many points did the participants A achieve on average in the other experiment?
(integers only)
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